

**ECPR Standing Group on the European Union  
EU Climate and Energy Section  
Rome, June 2021**

**PANEL OVERVIEW**

**Friday 11 June**

**9:00-10:30** – EU External Energy Policy: Between Geopolitics and Geo-economics (P037)

**11:00-12:30** – EU Climate & Energy Governance: Integration, Differentiation, Renationalization? (P31)

**15:45-17:15** – International Climate Governance: EU Actorness and Responsiveness (P70)

**Saturday 12 June**

**9:00-10:30** – European Green Deal: From Policy to Practice (P41)

**11:00-12:30** – Mobilization for Climate Policies: Parties, Youth and Lobbies (P079)

**DETAILED PROGRAMME**

**FRIDAY 11 June**

**9:30-10:30**

**EU EXTERNAL ENERGY POLICY: BETWEEN GEOPOLITICS AND GEO-ECONOMICS (PANEL 037)**

Over the past decade, the international system has gone through marked shifts, both in the distribution of power and its ideational underpinnings, such as the ascendancy of non-Western powers and the erosion of liberal economic ideas. This panel examines to what extent and how these changes are affecting the external dimension of EU energy policy. The papers in this panel engage with the discussion of what type of global regulatory actor the EU is and how this is affected by economic, political and security considerations.

**Chair: Bernardo Rangoni**

**Discussant: Marco Siddi**

**Paper 1**

**A historical-comparative analysis of the EU's external energy policy**

Paper Author(s):

Simon Dekeyrel

University of Nottingham

Abstract:

This paper will provide a historical-comparative analysis of the external energy policy of the EU. There are fundamental debates regarding the nature of the EU's external energy policy, especially how to gauge the developments in the last thirty years in respect to a radically different context. In the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, it is often said that there was a window of opportunity where the EU was in a position to export its internal market model towards third countries. In the case of energy, where the first steps towards an Internal Energy Market were being taken, this acquired special importance in the face of the Community's external dependence on energy supplies, which was expected to rise even further into the future. In the 2000s, this previously existing window of opportunity already started to wane. China projected itself onto the world's stage as a new economic superpower to be reckoned with through a form of state capitalism and with little respect for Western values. Russia, the EU's most important energy partner, became an increasingly assertive international actor - and increasingly uninterested in convergence to the EU's model. The question then became how the EU would react to these challenges. Would it keep aiming at exporting its own model towards third

states or would it adapt itself to a new international context, and engage in less normative policies in the external energy sphere? Similarly, there is still the question to what extent external energy policy in Europe is in fact driven by the EU, or whether the member states still control the domain through bilateral policies with producer states/third countries in general. This historical-comparative analysis will shed new light on both of these discussions, through a systematic comparison of the external energy policy of the EU from its very beginnings in 1957 up until now. It will show the gradual evolution of the division of labour between the member states and the EU, and will place the current role of the EU in external energy policy in an elucidating historical perspective. It will also show and analyse the evolution of the types of policies the EU engaged itself in, even before the end of the Cold War. This will show how the EU's external energy policy has changed or not changed over time, and why it has changed or not changed. In this way, the historical-comparative analysis will enrich the fundamental debates on the nature of the external energy policy of the EU, whether it has proved robust over time in the light of changing circumstances, and whether the external energy policy on the EU level in effect constrains the policy on the level of the member states.

## **Paper 2**

### **Beyond the Regulatory State: Rethinking the External Dimension of European Climate and Energy Governance**

Paper Presenter:

Andrea Prontera

University of Macerata

Paper Author(s):

Andrea Prontera

University of Macerata

Rainer Quitzow

Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS)

Andreas Goldthau

University of London, Royal Holloway College

Abstract:

The regulatory state model has traditionally provided a useful analytical framework to conceptualise the nature of the EU, to study its policy making and to assess its impact on global political economy. Although it is widely accepted that the internal and external conditions of European integration have dramatically changed since the 1990s, when this approach was initially formulated, few scholars have sought to theorise the EU 'beyond' the regulatory state perspective. This becomes even more evident as world politics have seen the forceful return of geopolitics, also in sectors that have been dominated by market-oriented approaches, like climate and energy. This paper contributes to filling this gap in the literature. It offers a conceptual alternative to the regulatory state model, a framework that opens a new research agenda on European (economic) governance and the EU strategy 'as power' in global politics (Goldthau and Sitter 2015, 2018). The paper puts forward a conceptualization of external EU governance based on the "catalytic state" model (Prontera 2017, 2019). The latter is conceptualized as being situated between the direct interventionist approach of the positive state and the indirect one of the regulatory state. The paper then proposes an initial theorisation of the EU's evolving role as a catalytic state and how this is manifested at the level of actors, instruments and policy frames. Building on this, it then develops the notion of Catalytic Power Europe to exemplify how the EU deploys its catalytic state capacities as resources for projecting power in international affairs. Crucially, the catalytic state – as well as its external extension as catalytic power – rests on more interventionist tools and mechanisms of connectivity, mobilization and (positive and negative) networking. Drawing on examples from climate and energy diplomacy, the paper then illustrates how these tools and mechanisms are deployed by the EU to achieve its external objectives in these policy fields. It demonstrates that these go beyond existing conceptualisations of the EU's actorness in global politics as a by-product of its regulatory state identity and regulatory capacity, i.e. Regulatory and Market Power Europe (Bradford 2012; Damro 2012, 2015). By contrast, the paper demonstrates that the EU is set to emerge as a distinct player in a world of 'geo-economics'.

### Paper 3

#### **Geopoliticising the Energy Transition? The External Dimension of the European Green Deal**

Paper Author(s):

Anna Herranz-Surrallés

Maastricht Universiteit

Abstract:

The Covid-19 pandemic and the ensuing economic crisis have placed the transition to low- carbon energy systems at the heart of the recovery policies in many countries around the world. While this convergence could finally foster the massive investments and international cooperation needed to achieve the goal of carbon neutrality by mid-century, the current geopolitical context also suggests declining stocks of trust among relevant actors. For example, even liberal-minded actors such as the EU and its Member States have become warier about foreign acquisitions in the energy sector, due to concerns such as the rising exposure to cyber- attacks, political interference, or so-called ‘forced technology transfers’ which could affect the EU’s aim for technological leadership in sectors such as renewable energies or hydrogen. This paper examines this growing trend towards the geopoliticisation of the energy transition and its impact on the practices of EU energy diplomacy. Building on a critical geopolitics approach, the paper argues that the growing geopoliticisation of the energy transition pushes the EU towards an inward-looking approach that makes the EU’s Green Deal diplomacy particularly challenging.

**11:00-12:30**

#### **EU CLIMATE & ENERGY GOVERNANCE: INTEGRATION, DIFFERENTIATION, RENATIONALIZATION? (PANEL 31)**

The Governance Regulation for the Energy Union and Climate Action has established a delicate balance between working towards common goals and retaining national authority. This panel examine the implementation of the Governance Regulation, examining the performance of the Member States and the response by the Commission and other EU institutions. The panel can thereby contribute to the on-going discussion on whether the Regulation means a hardening of EU energy and climate governance or it signify its renationalization.

**Chair: Philip Thaler**

**Discussant: Sebastian Oberthür**

### Paper 1

#### **The Commission’s new energy policy tools: Ex ante evaluation of EU member states in National Energy and Climate Plans**

Paper Presenter:

Matúš Mišík

Department of Political Science, Comenius University Faculty of Arts

Paper Author(s):

Matúš Mišík

Department of Political Science, Comenius University Faculty of Arts

Abstract:

Although there is almost unanimous support for the ultimate goal of developing carbon-neutral economy within the EU by 2050, many member states have shown reluctance to adopt binding goals at national level in mid-term perspective. In order to facilitate the process of decarbonisation of the EU’s economy and especially the energy sector, the European Commission proposed Governance of Energy Union regulation that included several tools facilitating member states’ implementation of strategies and measures ensuring their contribution to EU’s climate and energy targets. Most importantly, it requires member states to develop integrated ten-year National Energy and Climate Plans, first of which is supposed to detail national policies and pathways contributing to 2030 targets. After member states submitted their draft Plans at the end of 2018, the Commission evaluated these and provided recommendations to the member states based on existing benchmarks included in previously adopted rules. The paper examines in detail sector of renewables where the Commission criticized many member states for not proposing enough ambitious goals. It studies all areas of renewables where the Commission used benchmarks in its evaluations (stemming from revised Renewables Directive of 2018) and

examines the development of member states' renewables targets as presented in draft and final versions of their Plans. This paper argues that within this system, the Commission changed its evaluation of member state's performance in energy sector from ex post to de-facto ex ante. This indicates further change of Commission's position in energy areas where it is trying to strengthen supranational governance model.

## Paper 2

### EU Biofuels Policy as a Zombie Policy – Resurrection by Renationalization?

Paper Author(s):

Thomas Vogel

phl

FernUniversität in Hagen

Abstract:

In the context of rising oil prices, agricultural surpluses and climate change, biofuels appeared on the European policy agenda as a potential solution to multiple problems in the 2000s. Therefore, extensive support policies have been adopted, primarily the Renewable Energy Directive (RED I). Subsequently, however, the potential downsides of using biofuels became visible and the biofuels 'win-win' narrative was questioned increasingly. Rather than being the solution to multiple problems, biofuels themselves became a multiple problem, allegedly responsible for land-grabbing or rising food prices. This ambivalence is reflected both in the 2015 ILUC directive, which set a 7% cap for conventional biofuels, and in the 2018 recast of the RED I, the RED II, which largely stopped further growth of the sector, while maintaining already existing support schemes. Thus, EU biofuels policy might be an example of a "zombie policy" that is "so devoid of content that, although inscribed on paper, (...) [it is] in reality dead" (Bob 2012: 32), based on a "zombie idea" that, "although largely unproven in practice, tend[s] to survive and to be adopted again and again" (Nagel/Peters 2019: 2). In this paper, I firstly enhance the concept of zombie policies by equipping it with some theoretical background and conceptual features. Based on document analysis and semi-structured interviews with political actors in Brussels and Berlin, I apply this framework to EU biofuels policy and show to what extent it features traits of such a zombie policy. Secondly, I ask as to whether this "zombieization" at the EU level is accompanied by a renationalization of European biofuels policy that might lead to the resurrection of biofuels policy in certain member states. Using Germany as an example, I more specifically look at the interdependencies of policy negotiation processes both before the adoption of the RED II and during its current implementation at the national level. On the one hand, the phasing-out of conventional biofuels proposed in the 2016 RED II proposal significantly influenced the negotiations on the cap for conventional biofuels in Germany that had to be introduced based on the ILUC directive. As negotiations at the EU level progressed, however, and Parliament and Council adopted their opinions that proposed sticking to the 7% cap, this changed the negotiations between the ministries involved in implementing the ILUC directive and their outcome. The RED II, on the other hand, in line with the general EU governance approach to energy and climate policy, leaves much more leeway to member states as regards setting goals and ways to achieve them, which currently fuels some actors' hopes of a resurgence of a national biofuels policy in Germany. I close by reflecting on the relation between the apparent "zombieization" of biofuels policy on the European level and its renationalization and on what it reveals regarding the EU's climate and energy transition and its governance more generally. Literature: Bob, C. (2012): *The Global Right Wing and the Clash of World Politics*. Cambridge. Nagel, M.; Peters, B.G. (2019): *Zombie Ideas: Why Failed Policy Ideas Persist*. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334327745\\_Zombie\\_Ideas\\_Why\\_failed\\_ideas\\_persist](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334327745_Zombie_Ideas_Why_failed_ideas_persist).

## Paper 3

### Populist Discourses on Climate in Europe: Undermining the EU's Energy Transition?

Paper Presenter:

Marco Siddi

University of Edinburgh

Paper Author(s):

Marco Siddi

University of Edinburgh

Antto Vihma

University of Eastern Finland

**Abstract:**

In recent years, populist parties have risen to prominence in the political systems of numerous European states. While these parties have traditionally focused their rhetoric on topics such as migration or the European Union, for many of them climate policy has now become a significant political issue. The increasing centrality of climate change in European public debates has motivated far right populists in countries such as Germany, Sweden and Italy to engage with the topic. As mainstream political forces have framed climate change as an urgent challenge, and devised complex policy and governance frameworks to address it, far-right populists questioned the need to prioritise such frameworks and, in some cases, even scientific evidence on climate change. However, populist discourses on climate policy take different forms and articulations depending on the national context. This paper investigates the different stances and nuances of European far-right populist parties on climate policy through an analysis of party manifestoes and media discourses in selected national case studies (Germany, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Poland and Italy). The article constructs Weberian ideal types of populist climate change positions, which can be taken as 'reference models' that help to identify and describe the differences in policy positions. Furthermore, the paper argues that populists have had little practical impact on EU policies concerning the energy transition so far. However, this may change in the future if they are able to mainstream discourses questioning scientific evidence or the urgency of climate change, and thus manage to shift the political and media debates in ways that deprioritise climate policy.

**15:45-17:15**

**INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE GOVERNANCE: EU ACTORNESS AND RESPONSIVENESS (PANEL 070)**

International climate governance has become growingly complex, with the proliferation of institutions that address specific dimensions of the climate change conundrum as well as a maze of bilateral, minilateral and multilateral dialogues. This panel examines the EU's actorhood in this changing landscape of international climate politics as well as its responsiveness to these global shifts and international commitments. The papers examine germane topics such as the degree to which the EU engages in issue-linkage in international climate negotiations, the EU's adaptation of its climate diplomacy, or the degree to which the EU complies with international commitments in a comparative perspective.

**Chair: Sebastian Oberthür**

**Discussant: Amandine Orsini**

**Paper 1**

**The EU's Negotiating Behaviour Across the International Regime Complex on Climate Change: The Case of the International Maritime Organization's Climate Change Strategy for Shipping**

Paper Presenter:

Joseph Earsom

Université catholique de Louvain

Paper Author(s):

Joseph Earsom

Université catholique de Louvain

Tom Delreux

Université catholique de Louvain

**Abstract:**

The EU regularly participates in a number of international fora related to climate change, each with its own norms, functional scope and membership (e.g. UNFCCC, G20, Montreal Protocol, International Maritime Organization [IMO]). Collectively, these fora make up the international regime complex on climate change. Although considerable attention has been paid to the EU's role within the UNFCCC, there has been significantly less focus on if and how the EU's negotiation behaviour is linked across the fora of the broader regime complex. Our paper extends the scope of study of the EU's climate diplomacy to the entirety of the regime complex. It addresses the following research question: How is the EU's negotiation behaviour linked across the different fora of the international regime complex on climate change? We investigate (1) whether the EU links the

negotiations in the different fora in its climate diplomacy; (2) which linkages the EU then employs; and (3) why the EU does so (or not). Pulling from work on international relations, issue linkages, negotiations, and regime complexes, we conceptualise expected negotiating behaviour types: coalition-building, forum shopping, issue linkage, and siloing/separation. We then develop several hypotheses relating to variables that might prompt different negotiating behaviours. Finally, the paper uses the case study of the IMO's highly-anticipated 2018 adoption of the Climate Change Strategy for Shipping to explore the validity of our ideal types and test our hypotheses. Using documents, reports from media and observers, and semi-structured interviews with EU officials involved in the events, we aim to (1) provide insight into actor behaviour within regime complexes; (2) better understand the EU's as an international climate actor in an increasingly complicated multilateral environment, and (3) present findings on the negotiation process of the IMO Strategy and the EU's role within that process.

## **Paper 2**

### **Trends in How the EU Responds to the Evolving International Politics of Climate Change**

Paper Presenter:

Joseph Earsom

Université catholique de Louvain

Paper Author(s):

Joseph Earsom

Université catholique de Louvain

Tom Delreux

Université catholique de Louvain

Abstract:

Over the past two decades, the international political landscape regarding climate change has been marked by the proliferation of international institutions, the emergence of new powers, and an increasing level of politicization. In the midst of this evolving global political environment, both the EU's climate policy and its climate diplomacy strategy continue to take shape. In this paper, we analyse the EU's responses to changes in international climate change politics from 2004 (the beginning of "post-2012" discussions) until 2018. This paper seeks to answer the question: How has the EU responded over time to the evolving international politics of climate change? Using automated text analysis combined with manual coding, we systematically study all relevant European Council and Council of the EU Conclusions (n~175) over that period in order to extract emergent trends via themes and key phrases in the texts. These core themes and phrases thus provide insight into how the EU's responses to the evolving international politics have changed. From this coding, we look to categorise EU behavior as passive, reactive, or innovative. Using an inductive approach, we then parcel out events and circumstances that may have contributed to changes in EU response trends. Our findings are subsequently synthesized with the broader literature on EU climate diplomacy in order to qualify EU responsiveness to the evolving international landscape. We expect that EU behavior became increasingly innovative and reactive over time. Our work's main contribution is that it adds an additional means of evaluating EU actor behavior in an international context: actor responsiveness. Furthermore, our systematic and longitudinal approach complements the existing canon of literature on EU climate diplomacy and leadership.

## **Paper 3**

### **The European Union's capacity to fulfill its international commitments in a comparative perspective. The case of climate change mitigation**

Paper Author(s):

Johannes Müller Gómez

Université de Montréal

Abstract:

In the Copenhagen Accord of 2009, the European Union and 22 other parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) committed themselves to mitigating their greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. Whereas the European Union will fulfill its commitment, other parties such as Australia, Canada and

South Korea will not reach their targets. This paper aims to understand these diverging outcomes. Existing literature has particularly dealt with policy preferences, party politics, public opinion and interest groups as explanatory factors for different levels of international compliance. Albeit the veto player approach has also already been exploited, we know little about the effects of specific multi-level structures on a system's capacity to achieve its climate targets. Against this backdrop, the overall question of my research project is as follows: What are the effects of multi-level structures on the fulfillment of international commitments? This paper specifically seeks to understand the extent to which the institutional set-up of the EU's multi-level system accounts for the EU's achievement of its 2020 targets. By bridging the existing gaps between European Union studies, comparative federalism and the international compliance literature, I develop a set of hypotheses that point to institutional specificities that potentially affect a system's capacity to reach its climate change mitigation target. On this basis, I conduct a least squares regression to compare the EU to other UNFCCC parties. My preliminary findings suggest that the division of competences between the EU and the national level, and the involvement of the member states in EU decision-making processes are crucial for the EU's successful fulfillment of its commitment.

#### **Paper 4**

#### **Reconfiguring EU-China Climate Relations: A New Answer to The EU's China Problem?**

Paper Author(s):

Jilong Yang

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

Abstract:

Based on an in-depth reading of policy documents and official speeches along personal interviews, this article examines the EU's reconfiguration of its relations with China in global climate governance over the past decade. This article sheds new light on the debate of the EU's China problem by showing that the EU's reconfiguration of its climate relationship with China facilitated the formation of a new mode of EU-China engagement in global climate governance. With this new mode, the EU can manage better its complicated relations with an assertive China bilaterally and multilaterally in approaching global affairs as well as constructing the EU's normative power identity. This article follows a three-step approach: it starts from introducing the EU's China problem and normative power identity construction. Then it focuses on unfolding the EU's reconfiguration of its climate relations with China. It particularly examines that how the EU reconfigured its climate engagement with China bilaterally and multilaterally and how the EU re-constructed its normative power identity within this reconfiguration process. Finally, this article concludes the new mode of the EU's engagement with China in global climate governance and explores the implications of this new mode on the EU's overall engagement with an assertive China in turbulent times.

**SATURDAY 12 June**

**9:00-10:30**

#### **EUROPEAN GREEN DEAL: FROM POLICY TO PRACTICE (PANEL 041)**

Following the Energy Union initiative of the Juncker Commission, Ursula von der Leyen's European Green Deal (EGD) once again brings energy policy to the center of European integration. This supranational policy entrepreneurship is somewhat surprising. Various crises in the EU have vividly demonstrated the limits of supranational integration and heralded a resurgence of intergovernmental policy-making. It is possibly against this background that the Commission has sought to advance EU policies within its area of competence rather than expanding its policy-making capacities to new areas.

However, the EGD is destined to be more impactful than its predecessor for at least three reasons. First, it is much broader in scope. While the Energy Union mainly promoted the integration of two areas of supranational activity, energy and climate, whilst establishing links to related areas, including competitiveness, research and social policy, the new agenda stretches horizontally more widely. Beyond energy and climate, the EGD covers environmental, economic, agricultural, health, social, transport and industrial policy, establishes links to research, innovation, education and digitalization, and draws upon

dedicated financial instruments. In combination with a Green Oath (“Don’t do harm”), this will mainstream climate in almost all areas of EU activity. Second, the importance of the EGD has been enshrined in the institutional structure of the Commission. The portfolio rests with the First Executive Vice President, Frans Timmermans, enhancing its visibility and influence. Finally, the EGD embodies a response to the election results of the European Parliament election 2019, in which EU citizens called for a more sustainable Europe. The agenda arguably has a strong mandate from the voters and enjoys broad support across the main political parties.

Against this background and given the timeliness of the topic, the EGD agenda offers interesting insights into dynamics of European integration in the 21st century. This panel invites papers that review the evolution of the EGD, analyze the role of the European Commission and other institutional actors in this development, evaluate the EGD against recent theoretical debates on European integration, analyze the Commission initiative in light of multiple crises in the EU, and compare the EGD to similar initiatives in Europe and around the world. Other submissions with a focus on the EGD are also welcome.

**Chair: Anna Herranz-Surrallés**

**Discussant: Matúš Mišík**

### **Paper 1**

**From emissions trading to the European Green Deal: Understanding shifts in EU climate governance**

Paper Presenter:

[Ingmar von Homeyer](#)

Vrije Universiteit Brussel

Paper Author(s):

[Ingmar von Homeyer](#)

Vrije Universiteit Brussel

[Sebastian Oberthuer](#)

Vrije Universiteit Brussel

Abstract:

The article analyses the shift in the modes of EU climate policy over time. We argue that this process followed a cumulative rather than disruptive logic in which governance approaches were not replaced but layered on top of each other. The emergence of each successive governance approach can be explained with reference to opportunities and constraints arising from three arenas: the international climate change negotiations; interactions between the European Commission, the European Parliament and EU Member State governments; and interactions with EU societal forces. The article proceeds in four steps. First, we develop an analytical framework consisting of three elements: a typology of governance approaches building on Boasson and Tatham’s work (this special issue); an explanatory framework that – on the basis of an historical institutionalist perspective on change and the literature on EU (environmental/climate) policy-making – pays particular attention to international pressures, interest aggregation among the main EU institutions, and the general state of the European integration project. Second, based on the typology of governance approaches, we analyse the successive layering of EU climate governance approaches. The empirical analysis focuses on the elaboration and adoption of key EU measures, i.e. the Emissions Trading Directive (2001-3), the Climate & Energy Package for 2020 (2007-9), the 2030 Climate & Energy Policy Framework for 2030 (2014-18) and the emerging European Green Deal. It finds a shift from a dominant market-based logic over a strengthening of socio-technical elements to a new emphasis on procedural governance. Third, we investigate the identified key factors to find an explanation for the successive shifts in the governance approach. Three institutional configurations appear to be particularly relevant: the two-level character of the EU’s involvement in international negotiations, the tension between more and less ambitious Member States, and the EU’s exposed democratic legitimacy and accountability. The final part discusses the findings, including the legitimacy and accountability challenges and opportunities arising from the Energy Union and the emerging European Green Deal.



## Paper 2

### **The European Green Deal: procedural supranationalism drives European integration**

Paper Presenter:  
Philipp Thaler  
Universität St Gallen

#### Abstract:

Only 11 days in office, the new President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, outlined details about a European Green Deal (EGD). This initiative is said to become a cornerstone of her presidency, shaping most areas of Commission activity through an ambitious legislative agenda. It promotes more sustainable policies by mainstreaming climate in other fields, setting ambitious climate targets and upscaling green finance schemes. Depth and scope of this supranational entrepreneurship are somewhat surprising. Only recently, crises in the EU have vividly demonstrated the limits of supranational integration and heralded a resurgence of intergovernmental policy-making. This paper argues that the European Green Deal illustrates a new development in European integration that could be conceptualized as procedural supranationalization. Seeking to cope with crises whilst acknowledging intergovernmental deadlock in the EU, the Commission pursues a procedural rather than legal expansion of competences to gain new governing authority. Three elements underpin this approach. Firstly, Commission entrepreneurship focuses on linking policy areas already under supranational competence instead of communitarizing new areas. Secondly, impact is generated through internal bureaucratic reconfiguration rather than implementing a new governance structure. Finally, the new initiative gains legitimacy by linking its content to the outcomes of the European election. Taken together, the Commission's new supranationalism is an approach that accommodates the constraints set by intergovernmental policy-making in the post-Maastricht era and could thereby become a role-model for European integration in the 21st century.

## Paper 3

### **The role of green financial instruments in the new European Green Deal**

Paper Presenter:  
Rosa Fernandez  
University of Chester

#### Abstract:

Green finance initiatives have been available for more than a decade now, as part of the so called Green New Deal to lead Western economies out of the international economic crisis of 2007-08. The purpose of this paper is to explore how said initiatives are being used by EU member states, and to which extent they can contribute to the wider aims of the new Commission's European Green Deal. The paper argues that green finance is in a transition period, from an initial focus on developed countries to a shift in priorities linked to the approval of the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement in 2015, which necessitates the inclusion of less developed countries for the achievement of sustainability goals. EU member states have been using green financial instruments unevenly, mostly to contribute to the implementation of renewable energy projects, however the actors involved in these projects are reduced to public authorities (governments), and big traditional energy companies, with limited participation of smaller players, or access to finance for citizen-led initiatives. Some argue that the use of these financial instruments should be limited to less developed countries, since developed ones already count on other support instruments that favour the implementation of renewable energy projects. This paper analyses if the proposed EGD really opens the door for new actors to participate in the energy transition process through green finance, which are the barriers or constraints for it to happen, and how it may affect EU commitments towards less developed countries.

## Paper 4

### **Turning the European Investment Bank into a Climate Bank: an Analysis through its Ever-developing Business Model**

Paper Author(s):  
Helen Kavvadia  
University of Luxembourg

Abstract:

Since its foundation in 1957, the European Investment Bank (EIB), the primary financial arm of the European Union (EU), has become the world's largest multilateral bank. It has been increasingly solicited by the EU to assist in facing a range of challenges. In 2014 it has been called upon to promote economic recovery against the backdrop of the financial crisis in the framework of the Juncker Plan. In 2019 the EIB has been asked by the new EU Commission President von der Leyen to turn into a "Climate Bank". Associated with the EU's Green Deal to be officially announced in January 2020, the EIB is asked to be a front runner of climate measures, topping the current political agenda. The EIB will be the first international Climate Bank. Existing scholarly work on the EIB is not proportionated to its size, clout, role and impact. Moreover, academic work focuses mostly on EIB past activities. This paper instead studies EIB's recently proclaimed make-over to a Climate Bank, through the launch of a new climate strategy and energy lending policy ending fossil fuel financing after 2021. The paper reviews the background and analyses this metamorphosis. Additionally, it evaluates EIB's current business model possibilities to support the shift to a Climate Bank. Business models allow insights of the structure, modus operandi and fundamental activities of an organisation. They enable organisations to create value and appropriate a share of that value. They are also useful tools for examining organisations. As the EIB's business model is not publicly available, the paper uses the model developed by the author on the basis of EIB publicly available legal documents. The paper posits that EIB's transformation to a Climate Bank does not necessarily imply a revision of its business model, as its current model is well conceived, robust and flexible. The paper expects, however, an EIB business model revision to be triggered by the departure of Great Britain, one of the four large EIB shareholder's, entailed by the country's decision to leave the EU.

**11:00-12:30**

**MOBILIZATION FOR CLIMATE POLICIES: PARTIES, YOUTH AND LOBBIES (PANEL 079)**

In a crisis-ridden EU, climate and energy policy is often seen as a respite – an area that provides a positive agenda of which the EU is in short supply. For example, the EU is preparing its long-term strategy aiming for carbon neutrality by 2050 and reviewing its just-adopted 2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework, as public mobilization for climate issues, such as the Youth for Climate movement, continues making headlines. This panel examines political and public mobilization for climate mitigation. Overall, the panel contribute to debates on how democratic and participatory climate and energy policy and approaches of a "just transition" help articulate more ambitious climate policies.

**Chair: Rosa Fernández**

**Discussant: Anna Herranz-Surrallés**

**Paper 1**

**Party group loyalty and national interests in EU climate policy making**

Paper Presenter:

Aron Buzogany

Freie Universität Berlin

Paper Author(s):

Aron Buzogany

Freie Universität Berlin

Stefan Cetkovic

Freie Universität Berlin

Abstract:

There is a long tradition of scholarship arguing that the EU has an in-built and self-reinforcing mechanism which facilitates 'races to the top' among member states and EU institutions leading to increased climate policy ambitions. In this context, the European Parliament has often been regarded as the key facilitator of the deepening and widening of climate and energy policies within the EU. Since its onset, the European Parliament has been to a surprising extent a 'normal parliament'. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have largely voted based on their left-right ideological positions and have demonstrated strong loyalty to European Parliamentary groups (EPG) rather than to their national interests. Focusing on climate and energy policy, in this

paper, we are interested when MEPs defect from their EPGs political line. Our analysis combines national level party manifestos, Euromanifestos and roll call data from the EP. Our analysis tests the hypothesis that parties showing a low salience for climate issues are the ones supporting the majority position of their political group and approve EU energy and climate policy.

## **Paper 2**

### **What does youth want for EU climate and energy policy?**

Paper Author(s):

Amandine Orsini

Université Saint-Louis - Bruxelles

Abstract:

While the process of drafting and implementing European Climate and energy Policy is known for having been very inclusive, several signs also indicate some limits regarding youth involvement in the negotiations and implementation of such policy. First, it is not clear if non-state actors representing youth within the policy process are autonomous. For instance, the European Youth for Climate Action in 2017 is one example of youth involvement, but that has been sponsored by one intergovernmental organisation (the EU), that might exercise influence on the selection of youth representatives and youth projects. Second, youth protests are increasing worldwide, with in particular the landmark Fridaysforfuture movement related to climate change, denouncing also a lack of youth involvement in global policies. The movement is strongly active in Europe. What does youth want for EU climate and energy policy? Understanding if the climate and energy policy of the EU is in line with youth interests is precisely the aim of this contribution. In particular, it proposes to assess to which extent the policy only aim at 'empowering youth', that is put youth in a situation of recipients of politics, or aim at taking youth as 'actors in their own rights'. It first identifies youth actors' involvement in the EU climate and energy policy, to then analyse their positions and influence on the policy process. The research rests on a systematic analysis of youth actors, of their statements and of their actions, during and as follow-up to the adoption of the policy, and in particular through the European transparency register, the national citizens' consultations initiatives (such as the Convention citoyenne pour le climat in France) and the participation of youth to the public consultations on climate Action at the European level of policymaking.

## **Paper 3**

### **Climate policy for sale? Interest group mobilization and success in EU climate policy**

Paper Author(s):

Iskander De Bruycker

Maastricht Universiteit

Abstract:

Recently, hundreds of thousands of people across Europe have been taking the streets, calling for tough measures against climate change. At the same time, numerous business groups are lobbying in Brussels for climate policy with a lighter touch. Little is known about which organizations are lobbying against stricter climate policy and even less about whether and when these organizations are successful. This paper seeks to address this lacuna by asking which groups lobby on EU climate policies and under which circumstances these groups achieve their policy goals. We expect that both political and financial resources are important for groups to mobilize and attain their preferences in EU climate policy. To test our hypotheses, we focus on five issues in EU climate policy for which we conducted 13 expert surveys with lobbyists and a large-scale content analysis of 699 statements in eight European news outlets. The data reveal that interest groups represent the largest political force opposing more stringent climate policies. Our results show that political resources, such as media attention and public salience, are not decisive for lobbying success. What matters for being successful in EU climate policies are the financial resources that lobby groups have to their disposal. These findings paint a pessimistic picture of lobbyists 'buying' favorable EU climate policies in Brussels.